The fragile nature of the social mind : a commentary on Alva Noë by Kyselo, Miriam
The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind
A Commentary on Alva Noë
Miriam Kyselo
In this paper I argue that while Noë’s actionist approach offers an excellent elab-
oration of classical approaches to conceptual understanding, it risks underestimat-
ing the role of social interactions and relations. Noë’s approach entails a form of
body-based individualism according to which understanding is something the mind
does all by itself. I propose that we adopt a stronger perspective on the role of
sociality and consider the human mind in terms of socially enacted autonomy. On
this view, the mind depends constitutively on engaging with and relating to oth-
ers. As a consequence, conceptual understanding must be seen as a co-achieve-
ment. It is a fragile endeavour precisely because it depends not only on the indi-
vidual but also on the continuous contribution of other subjects.
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1 Introduction
In the  paper  “Concept  Pluralism,  Direct  Per-
ception,  and  the  Fragility  of  Presence” Alva
Noë offers an exciting and dense insight into his
philosophical thinking. Combining his classical
work on the active nature of perception (Noë
2004) with his more recent inquiries into philo-
sophical method, presence, the arts, and human
nature  in  general,  Noë now  aims  at  a  more
thorough account of  conceptual  understanding
(2012).
Noë’s proposal must be seen in light of the
paradigm shift in the philosophy of mind and
cognition, from a cognitivist and representation-
alist  view  to  a  distributed  or  embodied  per-
spective on the mind. It is one of the so-called
“E-approaches”  to  the  mind  (enactive,  exten-
ded, embodied and embedded) that transcend
the classical view of the mind as being an isol-
ated entity located in the brain that passively
represents  an  outside  and independently-given
world  (e.g.,  Shapiro 2011;  Clark &  Chalmers
1998;  Noë 2004;  Varela et al. 1993;  Thompson
2007; Kyselo 2013). There are significant differ-
ences between these views (and they will be of
relevance  below),  but  generally  speaking  they
all rest on the assumption that cognition is not
in the head and instead requires bodily action
and the  environment.  Noë  uses  these  insights
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from the E-approaches to expand on the disem-
bodied and representationalist view underlying
the intellectualist approach to concepts, and in
this way, he provides a timely and innovative
elaboration of conceptual understanding that is
more encompassing than previous approaches. 
I  am  sympathetic  to  Noë’s  approach.
Methodologically speaking,  he illustrates  what
he promotes as the right style of philosophical
analysis,  an  inquiry  into  the  so-called  “third-
realm”  that  remains  “in-between—neither  en-
tirely  objective  nor  merely  subjective”  (Noë
2012, p. 136) but open for “conversation or dia-
logue” (Noë 2012, p. 138). My comment should
be considered an elaboration in the same vein. 
I agree with Noë with regards to the more
general  project  of  questioning traditional  con-
ceptions in philosophy of mind by adopting an
embodied  and  distributed  perspective.  That
said, however, I think that there is a problem
with  his  proposal.  Even though it  provides  a
great  number  of  important  insights,  I  think,
third-realm  fashion,  Noë’s  proposal  fails  as  a
general theory of understanding. The reason for
this is that in a crucial way his own epistemolo-
gical pre-conception of mind is not yet fully sep-
arated from the paradigm that it seeks to over-
come: while Noë acknowledges the role of the
bodily and active individual, he accepts a dicho-
tomy  that  is  prevalent  in  the  traditional
paradigm,  namely  the  split  between the  indi-
vidual and the world of others. His approach in-
herits what I have called the  body–social prob-
lem (Kyselo &  Di  Paolo 2013;  Kyselo 2014).
The body–social problem is the third in a series
of dichotomies in the philosophy of mind and
the successor to the classical mind–body prob-
lem and the  more recent  body–body problem
(Thompson 2007).  The body–body problem is
the question of how the bodily subject can be
at  once  subjectively  lived  and  an  organismic
body that is embedded in the world. The body–
social  problem elaborates  on  this  and is  con-
cerned with the question of how bodily and so-
cial  aspects  figure in the individuation of  the
human individual mind. Philosophers of cogni-
tion systematically assume that the mind is es-
sentially  embodied,  while  the  social  world  re-
mains the context in which the embodied mind
is embedded. On this view, the social arguably
shapes the mind, but it does not figure in the
constitution of the mind itself. 
In  what  follows,  I  first  show that  Noë’s
proposal  entails  the  same  presupposition  and
thus invites a new form of methodological indi-
vidualism that risks limiting conceptual under-
standing to the endeavour of an isolated indi-
vidual subject. I then introduce and discuss an
alternative proposal  for a model of  the indi-
vidual mind as a social ly enacted self. I argue
that since the world of humans is a world of
others and our social relations are what mat-
ters most to us, the social must also figure in
the constitutive structure of human cognitive
individuation.1 The human mind or self is not
only embodied but also genuinely social. From
an  enactive  viewpoint  the  self  can  be  con-
sidered as a self–other generated autonomous
system,  whose  network  identity  is  brought
forth through individual’s engagement in bod-
ily-mediated  social  interaction  processes  of
distinction and participation.  Distinction and
participation  refer  to  the  two  intrinsic  goals
that the individual follows and needs to bal-
ance. Distinction means to be able to exist as
individual  in  one’s  own  right.  Participation
refers to an openness to others and a readiness
to be affected by them. It refers to the sense
of  self  as  connected  and  participating.  Both
goals are achieved through engaging and relat-
ing  to  others.  The  processes  that  constitute
the identity of the human mind are therefore
not defined in terms of bodily but rather in-
terpersonal relations and interactions. On this
enactive approach to the self, the body is not
equated with the self but instead seen as that
which grounds a double sense of self as a sep-
arated identity and as participating. The body
mediates  the  individual’s  interactions  with
others (Kyselo 2014). 
I outline how the model of the socially en-
acted self can combine with and elaborate Noë’s
actionist account of concepts so as to arrive at
an even more encompassing view of human un-
1 By saying that sociality matters constitutively for the human self, I
mean that without continuously relating and engaging in interactions
with others, there would be no human self as a whole. The social is
not only causally relevant for enacting selfhood, but it is also an es-
sential component of its minimal organisational structure.
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derstanding as well as a deeper appreciation of
its fragile nature. 
2 The risk of crypto-individualism
Noë  observes  a  dichotomy  between  what  he
calls  the  intellectualist  approach  to  concepts,
the view that concepts are judgments, which is
endorsed by Kant and Frege, and the existential
phenomenological approach,  such  as  that  en-
dorsed by Dreyfus, which argues that concepts
are usually only used by the novice, and that
understanding  is  otherwise  already  given
through context  and situation.2 Noë disagrees
with  both  positions.  He rejects  the  idea  that
concepts  are  only  judgments,  fixed  and  just
“out there”, to help us represent the world; yet
contrary  to  the  anti-intellectualists,  Noë  also
emphasizes  that  conceptual  understanding  is
not  limited  to  the  novice,  but  “at  work
wherever  we  think  and  perceive  and  act  and
talk”.  What  the  existential  phenomenologist
thereby misses, according to Noë, is that skillful
mastery involves learning and development. Noë
assumes that, like intellectualism, anti-intellec-
tualism makes the presupposition that concepts
are equal to judgments and thus implicitly re-
duces the mind to a “realm of detached contem-
plation”  (2012,  p.  25).  For  that  reason,  Noë
calls anti-intellectualism crypto-intellectualist.
Noë seeks to find an alternative to the two
positions by questioning their very fundaments.
Rather  than  assuming  that  the  world  is  just
given and that everything is already present to
us,  Noë emphasizes  the active contribution of
the individual organism (2004,  2009). He pro-
poses  that  we  should  adopt  a  pluralistic  ap-
proach to concepts, according to which concep-
tual understanding is basically having the skills
required for accessing the world. There are dif-
ferent types or modes of access to the world, in-
cluding the modes of perception and action, the
(inter)personal,  and  the  emotional  mode.  On
this pluralistic account, thinking and perceiving
2 The existential  phenomenological  approach refers  to phenomenolo-
gists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who investigate the basic
structures of human existence. One of their assumptions is that prior
to any reflexive understanding, we are already attuned to the world
simply through our bodily being in it. Dreyfus calls this pre-reflexive
attunement to the world “absorbed coping” (2013, p. 21).
are not very different from one another. Both
are “a skillful  negotiation with what there is,
just  another  modality  of  our  environment-in-
volving  transactions”  (Noë this collection,  p.
16). From this perspective,  judgements belong
to a particular mode of access and form part of
a broader set of skills of conceptual understand-
ing. Noë then specifies the nature of our access
to the world. The world is not just out there
ready to be understood. Rather, it always has
to be made available and actively brought into
view or into “presence”, as Noë puts it. Con-
cepts are the means by which we can achieve
this. They are the techniques “by which we se-
cure our contact”  with the world (ibid.).  But
bringing the world into presence is not a fixed,
one-time or uni-directional endeavour. Concep-
tual understanding involves continuous engage-
ment with  the world;  it  can  change  and also
fail.  Noë proposes the notion of  fragility as  a
key for understanding conceptual activity as an
open  and  necessarily  vulnerable  phenomenon,
instead of a perfect application of definite rep-
resentations of the world. In this way, he over-
comes the limited view of both the intellectual-
ist  and anti-intellectualist  perspectives  accord-
ing to which concepts are judgments about an
independent world. 
One of  Noë’s crucial  insights is  that the
traditional  dichotomy  between  an  objectively
given  world  and  subjectively  experienced,  in-
ternally-processed  data  about  worldly  objects
can be  overcome by grounding  all  conceptual
activity in a broader “common genus”, i.e., skil-
ful  engagement  with  the  world.  But  what  is
even more important, and in this I think Noë
does not actually diverge far from Dreyfus and
other existential phenomenologists, is  that the
established unity of  different  modes of  under-
standing is not merely a unity in terms of styles
of access to the world, but also a unity groun-
ded  in  the  individual mind  as  a  whole.  But
what is that individual mind as whole?
Noë quite clearly presupposes that we are
not  our  brains.  We  understand  the  world
through navigating it with our thinking, skilful
sensorimotor body (Noë this collection,  2004).
This view breaks with the cognitivist paradigm
with regard to the constitutive elements of the
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system that does the understanding, and it also
breaks with it with regard to the relation of the
understanding system to the environment: the
system is not passive, but rather active and dy-
namical.  What  this  elaboration  implies,  yet
does not make explicit, is the fact that concep-
tual activity is done by a bodily agent who un-
derstands or has access to the world.  After all,
conceptual  understanding  is  not  just  under-
standing  about  something but always also un-
derstanding  for  someone  and  by  someone.  To
argue that thought and perception are unified
as  modes  of  access  thus presupposes  an  indi-
vidual who employs these different modes of ac-
cess, someone for whom the world can show up.
Without an agent that does the understanding,
postulating  a  unification  of  modes  of  under-
standing would not make any sense, as any un-
derstanding  would  remain  an  action  that  has
neither origin nor actor.
This is a point that Evan Thompson, who
is also a proponent of embodied cognition, has
already made on some of Noë’s earlier work on
enactive  perception  (2007).  According  to
Thompson, while emphasising the role of exper-
iences of objects, Noë underestimates the role of
subjectivity as such: the “sensorimotor approach
needs a notion of selfhood or agency, because to
explain perceptual experience it appeals to sen-
sorimotor  knowledge.  Knowledge  implies  a
knower  or  agent  or  self  that  embodies  this
knowledge” (Thompson 2007,  p.  260).  This  is
where I think Noë’s underlying epistemology re-
quires  elaboration.  Who  or  what  is  the  indi-
vidual subject that engages in this fragile en-
deavour of securing access to the world?
Thompson provides an insight that can be
seen as a major step into the right direction: he
proposes addressing the body–body problem, i.e.,
the question of how the agent can be at once
subjectively lived and an organismic or sensor-
imotor  body  that  is  embedded  in  the  world
(2007, pp. 235–237), by proposing an enactive
notion of selfhood. According to this notion, in-
dividual  agency  is  defined  in  terms  of
autonomy. It is seen as a self-organised network
of  interconnected  processes  that  produce  and
sustain  themselves  as  a  systemic  whole—a
bounded  identity  within  a  particular  domain
(Varela 1997;  Maturana &  Varela 1987).  Ac-
cording to Thompson, it is this autonomous self
that  gives  unity  to  the  sensorimotor  skills  in
terms of self-organisation and operational clos-
ure  (2005,  2007).  Operational  closure  means
that some process relations of the autonomous
network remain constant despite structural de-
pendence on the environment, i.e., each process
within the network is not only enabling but also
enabled by some other process. With the pro-
duction  of  such  a  self-organised  autonomous
identity the individual also acquires a basic sub-
jective perspective, from which interactions with
the world are evaluated respectively. This sub-
jective  perspective  is  what  Thompson calls  a
pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness (2007, p.
261). 
On Thompson’s enactive account, the indi-
vidual is now not only active and embodied but
also  an autonomous subjective  agent.  Import-
antly however, Thompson shares with Noë a du-
bious fundamental pre-supposition, namely the
idea that the individual mind or subject can be
equated with the individual sensorimotor body
or organism. The autonomous agent is a self-or-
ganised  “sensorimotor  selfhood”  (Thompson
2005,  p.  10).  As  a  consequence,  in  both
Thompson and Noë’s  views,  the  mind is  em-
powered and freed, as it is no longer restricted
to the passive, information-consuming existence
that is distant to the world and confined to the
narrow shells of our heads. Nevertheless, it still
remains a mind of a body in isolation: in isola-
tion from the world of others.3 This risk of an
individualist  account  of  the  agent  is  the  first
horn of a dilemma underlying Noë’s proposal.
The second horn has to do with the fact that
for Noë understanding is actually  not an isol-
ated endeavour. The social world is mentioned
3 Thompson clearly recognises the importance of intersubjectivity for the
process of understanding, arguing that “human subjectivity is from the
outset intersubjectivity, and no mind is an island” (2007, p. 383). He
proposes (in line with Husserl) that humans are from the beginning in-
tersubjectively open. However, it seems that Thompson’s emphasis on
sociality is either developmentally motivated and concerned with the in-
tersubjectively-open intentionality in object perception or a question of
our (rather sophisticated ability) to understand others and to make the
distinction between self and other. But the subject herself, despite being
intersubjectively open, is still a “bodily subject” (Thompson 2007, p.
382). In other words, the structures of subjectivity itself, the very net-
work processes that bring about the individual as an autonomous sys-
tem, are determined bodily, not intersubjectively.
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throughout the paper in the form of other sub-
jects that seem to enable the individual’s under-
standing in various ways. Some of the skills of
access are interpersonal and also,  as Noë em-
phasizes, have to be learned. 
The question is,  how do we learn skills?
We usually learn through a teacher, and thus
through  the  help  of  another  being.  Similarly,
how do we discover a piece of art? By discussing
it with a friend, who helps to bring about a new
perspective on it. The person whom we misun-
derstand and try again to understand is another
subject. Understanding is a highly intersubject-
ive endeavour, not only developmentally—in the
sense that we need others at some point in life
to learn a particular skill—but also in a con-
tinuously on-going sense, for much of the very
process  of  human  understanding  happens
through  and  with  others  contemporaneously.
Strikingly, however, though Noë admits this in
acknowledging  that  understanding  happens
through communication and thus  through the
contribution of other subjects,  the social  does
not seem to matter constitutively in his general
theory of conceptual understanding. The mech-
anism and structures of the process of under-
standing are  defined in  terms of  sensorimotor
processes, not in terms of interactions with oth-
ers, and the unity that grounds conceptual un-
derstanding  is  constitutively  the  sensorimotor
body in object-oriented action; it is not, more
dynamically put, the individual in its relation
to other subjects.  The worry is that in Noë’s
approach,  the  social  part  of  the  world  would
therefore only play the  weak role of an outside
and divided context.  In contrast,  on  a  strong
reading of  the relation between understanding
and  sociality,  engagements  and  relations  with
others would have a more than developmental
or  contextual  relevance.  Instead,  they  would
also be considered part and parcel of the very
structure of the process of understanding, and
they would (as I argue below) figure in the min-
imal constitution of autonomous selfhood.
Noë characterises Dreyfus’s anti-intellectu-
alist  stance  as  “crypto-intellectualist”  because
Dreyfus allegedly accepts the premises of the in-
tellectualist’s  view that  understanding is  rule-
based judgement. Yet one might say that in his
attempt to overcome the dichotomy between ex-
istential phenomenology and classical conceptu-
alism,  Noë  inherits  a  very  similar  problem.
Noë’s  actionist  approach opens  the  individual
up to the world; but, perhaps because he is try-
ing to avoid an implication of Dreyfus’ existen-
tial  phenomenology,  namely  the risk of  losing
the  individual  (as  already  immersed)  in  the
world,  Noë  also  risks  over-emphasizing  the
status of the embodied individual, thereby miss-
ing the deeper relation between the individual
and the social world. The undesirable implica-
tion is that conceptual activity is essentially an
isolated undertaking (since according to stand-
ard approaches to embodiment there is nothing
social  about  the  individual  body or  organism
per se). It is the lonesome individual by herself
who  navigates  through  the  world,  equipped
with a great set of skills that enable her to act
and to secure the access to the world.4 Because
Noë seems to implicitly accept the individual-
istic premise of the traditional cognitivist view,
one might say that that his proposal is crypto-
individualist.
Noë is not alone in making the crypto-in-
dividualist  presupposition.  According  to  Post-
Cartesian and non-cognitivist philosophy of cog-
nition, the mind supposedly involves an active
and dynamical engagement with the social and
material environment, and also has an experien-
tial dimension (Shapiro 2011; Clark & Chalmers
1998;  Varela et al. 1993; Thompson 2007). But
the integration of these aspects, and in particu-
lar that of the social and bodily dimension with
regards  to  the  individual  that  has  or  is  the
mind still remains a fundamental question. This
is what I have called the  body–social problem:
how can the mind be at once a distinct bodily
individual but  at the same time remain open
and connected to the social world? At the mo-
ment there is a dichotomy between views that
posit that the mind is embodied and views that
emphasize the relevance of situatedness and em-
beddedness.  On the former view, the mind is
active but confined to being an isolated indi-
4 Note that it does not actually matter whether one posits that the
mind is in the head or in the body, both claims are compatible
with the weak reading of the interrelation of individual and so-
cial world, according to which the social remains separated from
the individual. 
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vidual. On the latter, the mind is primordially
immersed in the (social) world. The first view
risks a new form of methodological individual-
ism where the individual mind, while no longer
restricted to the brain, is now confined to the
body.  Here  the  social  world  becomes  the  ex-
ternal,  independently  given  world  into  which
these newly embodied and active, yet essentially
isolated  individuals  parachute  (Kyselo 2014).5
The second view focuses too much on the inter-
action dynamics and risks losing the immersed
individual mind in the world (and social inter-
actions), thereby blurring the very epistemolo-
gical target of our philosophical inquiry (Kyselo
2013, 2014).
The body–social problem reveals a deeper
linkage between Noë and the stance of the ex-
istential phenomenologist that he actually seeks
to debunk. Both positions disagree with the tra-
ditional  Cartesian  picture  of  the  mind;  both
hold that  embodiment matters  vitally  for  the
mind. But notice that they also focus on differ-
ent  aspects  of  what a true alternative  to the
classical  view might look like.  The overall  al-
ternative basically involves a fundamental shift
in thinking about the relation between an indi-
vidual and the world. In this vein, Noë is right
to emphasise  the individual’s  power,  giving it
more responsibility in the very construction of
its own mind and of the world it experiences,
but  so  are  the  existential  phenomenologists
when they focus on worldly embeddedness and
the fact that a great deal of our being in the
world  relies  on  pre-given  structures  that  can
surpass the individual’s capacities. An emphasis
on individual  action and responsibility cannot
mean that the individual is all alone. We would
not have made enough progress if the main dif-
ference between Noë’s proposal and the repres-
entationalist  division  between  individual  and
world was that now, while being able to move
towards the world, the world does not also move
toward us but remains separate with regard to
other subjects. Other people are active, too, and
they shape not merely the world for us but also
5 This image is adapted from  Varela et al. (1993), who criticise the
traditional view as implying that the environment is a “landing pad
for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world” (p.
198); instead, they argue that the relation between world and indi-
vidual mind is co-determining. 
who we are as subjects.  But, speaking to the
potential  worry  of  losing  the  individual  in
worldly engagements, the solution is of course
neither  to  negate  any  need  for  differentiation
nor the necessity of the individual to have its
own  share  in  the  very  mechanism  of  under-
standing the world. Where I think both posi-
tions go wrong is in extrapolating from a part
of adult human phenomenology (even when it is
paired, as in Noë’s case, with an objective ac-
count of the constitutive mechanism of experi-
ence) to a general theory of understanding. In
crypto-individualism the individual mind carries
a heavy burden. It is free from passivity and yet
enormously  restrained  by the responsibility of
achieving the access to the world (and the social
world) and itself, all by itself. Existential phe-
nomenologists,  in  emphasising  the  importance
of the social world and its pre-given structures
in bringing about understanding then ease the
burden and free the individual from some of the
responsibility in achieving this; and yet at the
same  time  they  also  risk  depriving  the  indi-
vidual of its power and right to have a say in
that endeavour.6
It should be clear that neither position on
its own will suffice to overcome the dichotomy
inherent in the intellectualist view on concepts.
The  individual  cannot  understand  the  world
simply by being an individual body, but neither
is the world already understood just by simply
being immersed in it.
3 Deep dynamics and the enactive self
There exists a middle ground from which the
dilemma of having to choose between too much
or too little individualism can be avoided and a
more complete epistemological basis for concep-
tual  understanding  achieved.  Finding  this
middle ground basically consists in re-thinking
the nature of  the mind and of human under-
standing while doing more justice to the deep
interrelation  between  individual  and  social
world. To this end I have recently proposed the
6 This commentary is not the place to discuss this issue in detail, but
it should be noted that such a view can be expanded to political
philosophy and the philosophy of law, where it might have far reach-
ing consequences for questions concerning the nature of individual
rights and approaches to legal responsibility.
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concept  of  the  socially  enacted  self  (Kyselo
2014, 2013; Kyselo & Tschacher 2014). On this
approach, the individual is not sufficiently de-
termined  in  terms  of  active  embodiment;  in-
stead it is thought to incorporate social and re-
lational processes into the structure that makes
up its identity as an individual. This suggests
that without a “social loop” we cannot speak
about the human self as a centre of individu-
ation in any interesting sense. After all, humans
do not merely distinguish themselves against a
background of  material  objects,  but, crucially,
against  the world of  other  humans.  They be-
come someone, an identifiable individual against
a world of other individuals and social groups.
This idea should become clearer by recon-
sidering, or making more explicit, a number of
insights already implied in diverse approaches in
embodied cognitive science.
First, Noë’s crypto-individualism captures
something essential about the ways humans ac-
cess the world: we often experience the process
of  understanding  as  something  we  do  by
ourselves—the concepts we acquire and employ
are ours and to a large extent we appear to be
in control in our attempts to secure the world.
Noë’s other important insight is that conceptual
understanding  is  an  achievement.  It  is  a  far-
from-perfect endeavour, involving experiences of
vulnerability, openness, of not always being able
to own and to access the world.
The second insight  is  appreciated  in  the
debate  on  extended  cognition.  Clark &
Chalmers in their now classical paper “The Ex-
tended Mind” propose that a tool,  such as a
notebook or a computer, can count as part of
the  individual  mind  (1998).  This  essentially
functionalist  position  goes  against  Noë  and
“beyond the sensorimotor frontier” (Clark 2008,
p. 195)—the mind is not restricted to the body
but spreads across neuronal, bodily, and envir-
onmental features. The extended cognition ap-
proach to  embodiment has  been criticised for
being too liberal, since it lacks both a principled
definition of “body” and of “cognition”. It re-
mains  unclear  how an  environmental  prop  or
technology could be integrated into the cognit-
ive architecture of an individual mind (Kyselo
&  Di Paolo 2013, see also  Menary this collec-
tion). Yet, despite these shortcomings I believe
there are two important insights in this exten-
ded functionalist  account:  first,  that the indi-
vidual should not be restricted to the biological
realm (be it the brain  or  the body) but incor-
porates tools and technologies, and second, that
the mind transcends the individual physiological
body and that the world matters constitutively
for determining the boundaries of the mind. 
The third insight comes from the enactive
approach to cognition, which proposes that the
mind is  basically  an  autonomous system that
self-organizes its identity based on operational
closure.  The enactive approach thereby shares
with extended cognition the idea that the indi-
vidual is not clearly separable from the environ-
ment.  On  the  enactive  view,  the  individual’s
mind is “defined by its endogenous, self-organiz-
ing and self-controlling dynamics, does not have
inputs and outputs in the usual sense, and de-
termines the cognitive domain in which it oper-
ates” (Thompson 2007, p. 43). Identity is there-
fore not a given thing or a property, but  rela-
tional:  brought  forth  through  the  individual’s
on-going  and  dynamical  interaction  with  the
world.  This  approach adds  an insight  derived
from philosophy of biology, namely that like liv-
ing beings,  cognitive beings create an identity
that they strive to maintain, and that under-
standing  the  world  depends  on  the  purposes
and concerns of that identity (Weber & Varela
2002;  Thompson 2007) in that they guide and
structure our understanding.7
The three variants of embodied cognitive
science  therefore  all  reject  the  mind–body di-
chotomy and emphasise a dynamical interrela-
tion  between  embodied  individual  and  world.
All of them however, either miss or do not fully
acknowledge that the world is social and that
the individual is also a psychological and social
being whose concerns are more than object-ori-
ented. This is where the enactive approach to
the social self comes into play. It basically elab-
orates on and integrates the above insights, i.e.,
action (sensorimotor cognition), co-constitution
7 Interestingly, this is also an insight Dreyfus pointed out much earlier
when he argued that the “human world,  then is prestructured in
terms of human purposes  and concerns  in such a way that what
counts as an object or is  significant about an object already is a
function of, or embodies, that concern” (1972, p. 173).
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(extended cognition), and grounding in selfhood
(enactive cognition), by adopting a much more
radical perspective on the dynamical interrela-
tion between the individual and the world—let
us call this perspective deep dynamics. Deep dy-
namics means that the nature of  the relation
between individual and world is one of strong
co-constitution:  not  only  does  the  individual
actively  shape  and  structure  the  world,  the
world, too, affects the individual in its basic or-
ganisational  structure.  If  identity  and domain
depend on each other in a strong and mutual
sense, as the enactive approach to cognition has
it, then even more advanced non-organismic or
virtual notions of the body do not change the
fact that the organismic bodily domain is an in-
dividualist  domain  (Kyselo &  Di Paolo 2013).
In other words, the organismic body cannot be
related to the social at the same level of organ-
isational closure. The enactive approach to the
self  would  suggest  instead  that  the  level  at
which human selves can be usefully operational-
ised  as  autonomous  identities  is  social,  not
merely  embodied.  Admittedly,  by emphasising
how  conceptual  understanding  is  shaped
through social engagements with others, Noë’s
approach obviously also implies a bi-directional
relation  between  individual  and  world.  Simil-
arly, as we have seen above, Thompson’s sensor-
imotor subject is also clearly involved in inter-
subjective interactions (2005, p. 408). However,
the  bi-directional  impact  in  these  accounts  is
more  shallow than in the present proposal, as
they consider the (social) world to play a con-
textual or developmental role, or to matter with
regards to shaping object-recognition.  In deep
dynamics, in contrast, we expand on the insight
of extended cognition that the mind transcends
brain and body by acknowledging that this not
only  the  case  through  interactions  with  tools
but also through our social interactions and re-
lations  with  other  subjects.  The  idea  then  is
that qua being embedded in a social world, the
self,  and by that  I  mean the  individual  as  a
whole,  constitutively  relies  on  its  interactions
and  relations  to  other  subjects.  According  to
this elaboration on the enactive account of self-
hood, the self can be defined as a socially en-
acted autonomous system. It is:
a self-other generated network of precari-
ously  organized  interpersonal  processes
whose systemic identity emerges as a res-
ult  of  a continuous engagement in social
interactions  and  relations  that  can  be
qualified as moving in two opposed direc-
tions,  toward  emancipation  from  others
(distinction) and toward openness to them
(participation). (Kyselo 2014) 
In line with the concept of operational closure,
both types of processes, distinction and parti-
cipation, are required to bring about the indi-
vidual self. Without distinction, the individual
would risk immersion or becoming heteronom-
ously determined and forced to rely on the next
best or a limited set of social interactions. But
without participation and an act of openness to-
wards others, the individual eschews structural
renewal,  thus  risking  isolation  and  rigidity
(Kyselo 2014). The point, however, is that this
form of operational closure contains social inter-
actions.  In enactive terms, this is to say that
the  individual  is  at  the  same  time  self-and-
other-organized.  As  a consequence,  the self  is
not a given nor an individual  bodily achieve-
ment  but  also  and  necessarily  co-constructed
with others. Both the individual and the world
(that is, other subjects) have a say in the con-
stitutive mechanism of someone’s mind. In con-
trast to Noë’s presupposition, the mind cannot
be equated with the active body. Rather,  the
sensorimotor  body  becomes  the  ever-evolving
interface that in being with others co-generates
the  very  boundaries  of  what  we  call  the  self
(Kyselo 2014).
At this point, proponents of embodiment
might still  want  to insist  that  there  is  some-
thing about the body’s  role  in  grounding the
sense  of  self  that  non-negotiably  remains  en-
tirely  independent  from  social  interactions.  I
agree, if by “sense of self” one refers to the self
as mere biological identity. However, if by “self”
we  mean  the  human  self  in  distinction  from
other  humans,  then  the  proposed  view  chal-
lenges  this  intuition.  It  does  this,  however,
without giving up the insight that the self has
to do with individuation. The enactive notion of
autonomy and self-organization saves the indi-
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vidual  from immersion in  the social  world by
appreciating that the distinction between indi-
vidual and world is an organisational, not onto-
logical distinction. Our sense of being a distinct
someone is something that is achieved together
with  others,  not  just  qua  being  a  biological
body.
The basic idea of the socially enacted self
is therefore not to overcome the tension entailed
in the body-social dichotomy but rather to wel-
come and recognise it as a necessary property of
mind itself  and to thus integrate this  tension
into a general theory of understanding. On this
view, the individual mind has to continuously
negotiate its identity as an individual agent and
its understanding in dependence on other sub-
jects.  As  a  consequence,  uncertainty,  conflict,
and a permanent need for negotiation and co-
negotiation are part and parcel of being an es-
sentially  social  human  mind.  This  is  why  it
might be useful to distinguish several senses of
fragility. Fragile understanding is one of them.
But on the enactive account of selfhood, mind
itself is fragile.
4 Varieties of co-presence
Let us now explore a couple of implications that
a deep dynamics view has for conceptual under-
standing.  By basing  conceptual  understanding
on an understanding of the individual as a so-
cially enacted autonomous system, we can do
justice to existential phenomenologists who em-
phasize the importance of situatedness and flow
and  also  to  Noë’s  rightful  actionist  call  for
emancipation  of  the  passive  individual  mind.
For Noë, the unity of conceptual modes is de-
rived from positing an active, thinking, sensor-
imotor body. The present proposal suggests that
the unity is grounded in a socially co-organized
individual.  Noë’s idea of thinking of experien-
cing and understanding the world as a “relation
between  a  skillful  person  and  really  existing
thing” (2012, p. 42), could thus be elaborated
by saying that the intentional relation is also a
relation to other subjects, so that intentionality
is actually co-generated. Yet this co-generated
intentionality is not merely about sharing a per-
spective on the world; it is a co-generated rela-
tion  that  feeds  into  the  very  organisational
structure of mind itself. The person involved in
the intentional relation is a social subject. In ac-
cordance with the two-fold structure of socially
enacted autonomy, this  would also  mean that
self-reflexivity has a social structure, entailing a
sense of being a self as separate individual and
a  sense  of  being  open  and  connected  to  the
world.
Here  lies  the  deeper  reason for  why the
process of understanding is fragile. The fragility
of  understanding consists precisely in the fact
that the unity of mind is never a given, but is
itself an on-going achievement. Since, as I sug-
gest, this is an achievement with others, pres-
ence does not merely depend on what we do,
but also on what others do, and especially on
what we do with them. In other words, presence
is actually co-presence. It is clearly outside the
scope of  this  commentary to explicate this  in
more  detail,  but  generally  speaking  it  means
that  understanding  simply never  really  is  the
endeavour of an individual mind. This comple-
ments Noë’s perspective and invites future ex-
plorations in at least two fundamental senses. 
First, with regards to the role of others in
empowering the individual by enabling access to
the  world:  our  conceptual  skills  are  acquired
and the acquisition of these skills usually hap-
pens  in  interaction  and  by  learning  together
with others. But our ways of understanding are
also continuously shaped and mediated by being
with others, be it through cultural norms, bi-
ases, advice, or advertisement. Apart from the
obvious fact that much of instantaneous under-
standing happens together with others, even in
the absence of others, in the process of under-
standing, we often presuppose another subject
or  at  least  some  implicit  act  of  relationality.
Noë says that “there is no such thing as a per-
ceptual encounter with the object that is  not
also an encounter with it from one or another
point of view” (2012, p. 138). I could not agree
more,  and yet  I  suggest  we also  embrace the
idea that these other viewpoints are not merely
defined in terms of  changes in head or body-
movement  but  also  in  terms  of  loops  to  and
from  different  subjective  and  intersubjective
view points.
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If conceptual understanding has the purpose
of bringing us into contact with the world, as Noë
claims, then we should not underestimate the role
of others and of our being open to them in mak-
ing this contact possible. To consider human un-
derstanding as fragile is also to admit a limitation
of the individual’s capacities and to allow others
and our dialogues with them to play a funda-
mental role. In this sense fragility can be a source
of power. Our minds are open, not only to the
world, but also to contributions from others.
But that said, and this is the second and
final implication of the enactive self for the ba-
sic nature of human understanding, the social
nature and fragility of mind also restricts the
individual’s capacities. When the social plays a
marginal  and contextual  role,  the  individual’s
responsibility in understanding the world is im-
mense and the optimism in the individual’s ca-
pacities can become a heavy burden. The other
side of fragility is that the presence of the world
is not only “not for free”, as Noë puts it, but it
is actually sometimes not available at all. It is
not available because other subjects have a say
in the construction of our understanding, and
given that they have perspectives and interests
of their own, their contribution may sometimes
be out of reach, run contrary to what we need,
or even confuse us deeply. The fragile nature of
our social mind can therefore also deny us ac-
cess to the world. 
5 Conclusion
In his book  Varieties of Presence, Noë refers to
Kafka’s  The Metamorphosis  (1915), the story of
Gregor Samsa, who wakes up as an insect, lying
on his back, unable to move. Noë uses the story
to illustrate the upshot of his philosophy of un-
derstanding. “We are not only animals”, he says,
but we “achieve the world by enacting ourselves.
Insofar as we achieve access to the world, we also
achieve ourselves” (Noë 2012, p. 28). 
On the presented alternative, the actionist
nature  of  self-achieved  understanding  is  only
half  of  the  story.  I  have  suggested  that  our
minds and selves are genuinely social and thus
transcend  the  limits  of  our  bodily  existence.
The human self vitally depends on others and is
achieved together with them, through negotiat-
ing a permanent tension of maintaining a sense
of individuality while not losing the connection
to others (distinction and participation). 
From this perspective, the point of Kafka’s
story is therefore not so much to deny that we
are animals, but rather to claim that we are so-
cial animals that achieve ourselves together with
others. Reflecting the basic insight of this pa-
per, the story thus illustrates the fragility and
social nature of human existence. It is an ex-
pression of desperation and of the suffering that
can come when others refuse or are unable to
comply with our basic needs: being recognised
as individual  and as someone who belongs to
others.  Having  lost  contact  with himself  as  a
human subject in the bureaucratic machinery of
his professional life, Samsa awakes as an insect,
his  new embodiment  an  imprint  of  alienation
and loss of recognition. But the loss cuts even
deeper. With his alien embodiment Samsa the
insect is rejected by his family, so that he finds
no salvation in his private life. Samsa dies from
social  isolation. From an enactive view of the
self as a joint achievement, Kafka’s  The Meta-
morphosis  captures  (like  much  of  his  other
work) the consequences of our deep vulnerabil-
ity and limited freedom and the drama of the
loss from which we can suffer precisely because
we are social beings. 
The social structures that we depend upon
empower our ways of understanding; yet for the
same reason they can also enslave us, and seri-
ously limit our mental capacities. This, I sug-
gest, is not merely the case for institutions and
their bureaucratic apparatus but also applies to
our direct intersubjective relations, be they with
lovers, friends, family, or co-workers. 
Presence is therefore not simply availabil-
ity—since this would suggest the subject’s un-
warranted  access  to  the  world.  Presence  is
rather a joint achievement, and the nature of
doing things together is that there will always
be leaps and limitations. In this way, failure and
limited control over the ways we understand the
world are not entirely the responsibility of the
individual and its techniques and skills, but also
a deeper expression of the genuinely social and
co-constructed nature of understanding.
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